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Dπ is a simple distributed extension of theπ-calculus inwhich agents are explicitly located,
and may use an explicit migration construct to move between locations.
In this paper, we introduce passports to control thosemigrations; in order to gain access to
a location agents are now expected to show some credentials, granted by the destination
location. Passports are tied to speciﬁc locations, from which migration is permitted. We
describe a type system for these passports, which includes a novel use of dependent types,
and prove that well-typing enforces the desired behaviour in migrating processes.
Passports allow locations to control incoming processes. This induces major modiﬁcations
to the observations which can be made of agent-based systems. Using the type system
we describe these observations, and use them to build a loyal notion of observational
equivalence for this setting. Finally we provide a complete proof technique in the form
of a bisimilarity for establishing equivalences between systems.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Dπ [1] is a process calculus designed to reason about distribution of computation. It is built as a simple extension of the
π-calculus in which agents are explicitly located without nesting so that a system might look like:
l1[[c !
〈
b
〉
P1]] | l2[[P2]] | (new a : E)(l3[[P3]] | l1[[c ? (x : T) P4]])
where the li are location names and the Pi are processes located in one of those locations. Here, P1 and P4 are placed in the
same location l1, even if they are scattered in the term. Channels also are distributed: one channel is anchored in exactly one
location: two processes must be in the same location to communicate. In our example, the system can evolve into
l1[[P1]] | l2[[P2]] | (new a : E)(l3[[P3]] | l1[[P4{b/x}]])
when P1 and P4 communicate. ThismakesDπ a streamlineddistributedversionof theπ-calculus,which allows to concentrate
our attention on agent migrations.
Dπ agents can trigger their migration from their current location, say k, to the location l via the primitive
gotop l
The p, added by the presentwork, is a passportwhichmustmatch the actualmigration attempted, from k to l. Those passports
are permits, requested whenever trying to enter a location and therefore allowing that location to control which processes
should be granted access.
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Some other approaches to control migrations have been investigated in process calculi. A very generic idea has been
developed in [2]: every location is composed of two layers, a membrane and the actual body. Every migration attempted
must then go through the membrane in which some controls are performed to implement an access policy. A few such
policies were considered for instance in [3]. In the setting we propose here, we allow normal processes to control the access
policies themselves by delivering passportswhen needed: the only part of the control ofmigrations that appear in the syntax
of processes is precisely those passports.
In Ambients-related calculi, the migrations are particularly hard to control so many works tried to address this problem:
in Safe Ambients [4], the destination location must grant access to incoming ambients by using a co-capability. These co-
capabilities have been enriched in [5] with passwords: the password used to migrate is syntactically checked at runtime
when the migration is to be granted. This idea of passwords was pursued in the NBA calculus [6] which combines it with
another choice to control behaviours of ambients: communications across boundaries are allowed so that the troublesome
open primitive from the original Mobile Ambients can be removedwithout impeding the expressiveness of the calculus. This
second approach was also used in different hierarchical calculi like Seal [7] or Kell [8]. Another way to control mobility is
to rely on type systems. In Mobile Ambients, [9] introduces a type system to characterise which ambients might end up in
which ambients and which ambients might be opened inside another ambient. To avoid the complexity of dependent types,
this work uses groups: when a name is generated, it is attributed a group; every mobility control is then performed at the
level of groups. [10] developed this control with a setting in which processes are allowed to move between ambients and
the type system indicates in which groups of ambients a process or an ambient might end up. Our approach, on the other
hand, allows processes running inside a location to control the processes trying to enter.
Hierarchy brings obviously a lot of complexity to the migration schemes so there are some type systems implementing
ﬁner policies in non-hierarchical calculi. For instance, KLAIM has been equipped in [11] with a type system to control access
to resources, including codemigration. Contrary to our setting, in that work location policies control where the code goes to,
and not comes from, and the policy is ﬁxedwhen the location is generated. The present work has beenmore inspired by [12].
In that work, access to a location is a capability tied to that location via its type: access is either always granted or always
denied depending on the type used when the location is generated. Of course, even when access is granted, the location
name can then be transmittedwithout giving access; nevertheless, this setting lacks ﬂexibility. In the presentwork,we reﬁne
that approach to be able to grant access selectively, depending on the origin location and to authorise such accessmigrations
dynamically, namely after the generation of the location itself. That is why passport names are added to the calculus to bear
those authorisations. We chose to use regular names to preserve the homogeneity of the calculus: in particular, they can be
exchanged over channels and their scopes are dealt with in precisely the same way as any other name, including for their
extrusions. Types are then used to tie rights to the names of the passports: for instance, the type l → k is attached to some
passport granting access to k from l. The typing system will therefore have to include dependent types to describe the link
between passports and the locations they are attached to. Since a passport must grant access to only one location, the one
which delivered that passport, using “groups" to try and avoid dependent types would fall back on deﬁning one group per
location and so it would only reduce the expressiveness of the language. Fortunately, those dependent types bring little
extra complexity to the type system itself and to the proofs of its properties, including subject reduction. What is more, this
approach to tie rights to types provides type-based tools and techniques to reason about security properties. We also argue
that relying on names to bear access rights gives a good handle to control those rights.
Other type systems have been used to control mobility in Dπ-based calculi. In [13], access requires the knowledge of a
port which also governs subsequent resource accesses by typing themigrating processes, using for this complex behavioural
process types developed in particular in [14]. This approach is strongly constraining processes and requires higher order
actions. The present work provides a ﬁrst-order theory that aims at becoming a foundation for a ﬁne-grained control of
comparable power to [13]: while the passport types developed hereafter correspond to a simple mobility control, they
should leave room to extensions to control resource accesses.
In [15], access to locations and resources is conditioned by policies based on the history of migrations of the agent. In
the present work, the only location of the history taken into account to grant access is the origin of the migrating process:
we will deﬁne a simple setting in which it is possible to describe “trust sub-networks" such as an intranet. Furthermore, the
origin of a process seems easier to assert realistically than its full history. The settingwe propose here relies on a simple view
of trust: when a location l expresses its trust into another one k (through a passport valid from k), it also decides to trust k
not to relay any dangerous process from another location.
In the following, we will investigate the notion of typed observational equivalence inherited from [16]. The founding
intuition of observational equivalences is to distinguish two systems onlywhen it is possible to observe a difference between
them through a series of interactions. In a typed observational equivalencewhere types represents permissions, the barbs the
observer is allowed to see are conditioned by the permissions it managed to get access to. Since permissions are represented
by types, a normal type environment is used to describe the observer’s rights.
Control of migrations has a great impact on the set of possible observations: since all interactions are performed over
located channels, permissions to access these locations, i.e. passports, are mandatory to observe anything if the observer
abides by the rules.Wewill therefore introduce an intuitive typed congruence that takes into account themigration rights of
such a loyal observer.We argue that relying on names to bear access rights also gives a clean equivalence theory, inwhich the
rights granted to the observer are easily expressed. As usual, the closure of the equivalence over all admissible contextsmakes
this equivalence intractable. So we will provide an alternative coinductive deﬁnition for this equivalence as a bisimilarity
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based on actions which identify the possible interactions between the system and its observer. This alternative deﬁnition
reveals a difﬁculty arising from dependent types: as an artefact of dependencies, some name scopes must be opened even
when the name itself is not revealed to the observer.
An extended abstract of the present work has previously been published at CONCUR [17].
Outline The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the calculus modiﬁed with passports is presented in Section 2, in
particular with its complex type system including subtyping order. Then an observational equivalence that characterises
how systems can use passports to protect themselves from observers is deﬁned in Section 3. A proof technique, in the form
of a bisimilarity, is provided in Section 4 to alleviate the complexity of the observational equivalence deﬁned in Section 3;
we also sketch in this section why this proof technique is complete. Finally, we ﬁnish with some concluding remarks and
perspectives.
2. Typed Dπ with passports
Wepresent here a stripped-down version of the Dπ-calculus to focus onmigration control. In particular, this version does
not include recursive processes, that were thoroughly dealt with in [18]. An account of the complete calculus is presented
in [19]. Let us start by looking at passports on examples.
2.1. Overview of passports
Dπ describes distributed computation as explicitly located processes that maymigrate between locations. To allow those
locations to control incoming processes, we devise a system in which they can deliver passportswhich will be required from
processes trying to enter the location. So the construct goto k now becomes gotop k, where p is the actual passport invoked
to authorise access to k.
The control we propose is ﬁner than a mere control of the name of the passport an incoming process use: a location is
also allowed to control that the origin of the incoming process corresponds to the passport. Passports can then be delivered
for speciﬁc communications. In the case of a simple client-server situation, the client can deliver a passport only for the
response coming from the server. It might be formalised as:
cl[[newpass pass from sv in
gotopsv sv. req !
〈
cl, (quest, res, pass)
〉 | . . . res ? (x) P]] (1)
where the client cl generates a passport pass speciﬁc to the server svbefore going there (using the passport psv) and requesting
some computation while waiting for the result on the channel res in cl. The corresponding server might look like:
sv[[*req ? (xcl, (xquest, xres, xpass) : T
) · · ·gotoxpass xcl. xres ! 〈r〉]] (2)
This example suggests a smooth enforcement of the origin control: a public server might want to accept every request,
whatever the originating location. The passports corresponding to such a policy, like psv in the example, can be created by
newpass psv from
where stands for anywhere.
Since passports allow a location to choose the locations it is accepting processes from, a location can thus express the
trust it is putting in its surrounding locations. Sowe can set up a situationwhere some locations l1, . . . , ln form a sub-network
and trust each other: to achieve this the location li would provide a passport pli granting access to every process coming from
one of the locations lj but it would deny access to any process coming from another location. It would look like:
N = (new pl1 : l2, . . . , ln → l1) · · · (new pln : l1, . . . , ln−1 → ln) l1[[P1]] | · · · | ln[[Pn]]
where every process coming from any other location than one of the lj would be simply denied access if it tried to use a
passport pli . This is indicated by the type annotation, for instance l2, . . . , ln → l1 for the passport pl1 .
Building on this example, we can add a gateway location gw through which every process coming from outside would
have to go:
(new pgw
li
: gw → li) · · ·N | gw[[Pgw]]
where the optional passports p
gw
li
would deﬁne the access policy of the inner locations for the processes which are incoming
from the gateway. For instance, when modelling a ﬁrewalled sub-network, the passports p
gw
li
would be revealed only to
processes originally created inside li: these processeswould naturally be allowed to enter back into the sub-network to bring
the result of their investigation.
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Fig. 1. Syntax for the Dπ-calculus.
Let us now describe formally the calculus with passports.
2.2. Syntax & semantics
Processes are described using names (usually written a, b, . . . , reserving c, d for channel names, k, l for locations and p, q
for passports) and variables (usually written x, y, . . . ). When both names and variables can be used, we will talk of identiﬁers
and write them u, v, . . . . We will write u˜ for a set of identiﬁers and u for a tuple. We will also write u˜ when either u˜ or is
expected. Finally, we will use capital letters when tuples are allowed so V can represent (v1, (v2, v3), v4) or any other value,
composed of identiﬁers and X any pattern, composed of variables.
The syntax of Dπ is given in Fig. 1. Our contributions are:
• The migration construct gotov u now mentions the passport v to get access to the location u.
• The new construct to generate passports, newpass, provides two kinds of origin control:
◦ passports that allow migration from a given set of originating locations u˜ are created by newpass p from u˜; thus a
location can express its trust in the sub-network u˜: every process using p will be granted access from any location
in u˜;
◦ universal passports, that allow migration from any location (for instance when describing the behaviour of a public
server accepting requests from anywhere) are created by newpass p from.
Of course, the location a passport grants access to is the location where the passport is generated: that is the only way to
allow locations to control incoming processes.
• The construct to generate new locations, newloc, is enriched: passports to access the new location (child) or the location
where the construct is called (mother) can be generated on the ﬂy. This is the onlyway tomodel all the possible situations
(the child location granting access to processes from the mother location; or vice versa; and any other variation). Indeed,
if passports to access the child were always created from inside the child itself, some passports granting access from the
child would be needed to export them. . .
Let us consider now the semantics associated with the calculus, deﬁned by the rules given in Fig. 2 using the standard
structural congruence. The ﬁrst three rules concern particularities of the present work, the other ones are inherited. For
instance (r-comm) is a really standard communication reduction rule between a sender and a receiver: the substitution of
the pattern X by the actual content of the message V is triggered.
The new reduction rules are fairly unsurprising since passports are added to the calculus as regular identiﬁers. In the
reduction rule for the migration (r-goto), the passport involved is simply ignored: the veriﬁcation of the passport will be
performed using types. In the reduction rules of the constructs generating names, types are instantiated: in the inherited
(r-newchan) rule, for instance, when channels are generated their type C becomes the explicitly located type C@l; similarly,
when passports are actually generated in (r-newpass), they are tied to the location towhich theywill grant access, by getting
the type k˜ → l (type for a passport allowingmigrations from k˜ to l). As for (r-newloc), themain operation taking place is the
generation of a set of news, one for each of the names actually generated. Again, this operation involves modiﬁcations in the
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Fig. 2. Reduction semantics.
type annotations. These are taken care of via the expansion〈· · · 〉 which sequentialises the value (k, ((c), (p), (q))) into a list of
names while attaching some type to every name. Since this relies heavily on the type system, it will be explained with it.
2.3. Type system for the language
Using the standard approach, the type system for Dπ is built by attaching types to identiﬁers. Following the approach
used in previous works on Dπ , types describe permissions. This view is highly relevant for passports: the type l → k we can
attach to a passport indicates the authorisation tomigrate from l to k. The typechecking performed on processes and systems
is then based on a set of hypotheses, which associate types to names, and veriﬁes that every use of identiﬁers is allowed,
i.e. done according to the permissions tied to types. Again, we provide here only a simple presentation of the set of types
to focus on passports. In particular, we got rid of the recursive types which are completely orthogonal to passports types;
see [18] for a detailed account of recursive types.
2.3.1. Types for identiﬁers and values
The deﬁnition of the types that can be associated with identiﬁers is stratiﬁed: the types for channels mention the types
of the values exchanged over it. So the types for identiﬁers and for values are deﬁned at the same time: they are summed up
in Fig. 3. In fact, the syntax given in this ﬁgure describes pre-types. We will explain shortly which pre-types are actual types.
Two major modiﬁcations are made in types. Firstly, we introduce new types for passports:
• u˜ → v will be the type of a passport to access v from one of the locations in u˜ and → v of a universal passport to v;
• when passports to v are communicated inside a location l to be used to migrate from l, we call them local passports and
we can give them the facility type ↪→ v.
Secondly, we add a dependent sum type for values that are transmitted over channels: since the type for a passportmentions
thenamesof the source and target locations, thedependent sumprovides away to send thosenames (locations andpassport),
packed together. This way, a location l and a local passport p to migrate to l might form a pair (l, p) of dependent type
∑
x :
loc. ↪→ x. The type T in the server of our ﬁrst example (2) would be such a dependent sum, with a tuple as the second value.
Those dependent types are also used to describe the tie between the locations and the passports in the newloc construct,
as described by the declarative types L. As mentioned before, the system
l[[newloc k, (c), (p), (q) : Lwith Pk in P]]
will generate a new location k togetherwith a set of passports p to access k (for instance from l), a set of passports q to access l
(for instance from k) and, ﬁnally, a set of new channels c located inside k. The tie between those passports and the locations
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Fig. 3. Syntax of pre-types.
Fig. 4. Expansion of values.
they grant access to are encoded in dependencies: in the types of the form
L =
∑
x : loc.
∑
y : loc. (C1@y, . . . ), (u˜1 → y, . . . ), (v˜1 → x, . . . )
the type variable xwill be bound to the name of themother location (l in our example), and y to the child location (here k). As
the reduction rule (r-newloc) indicates, when the type L used in the newloc construct is of the form
∑
x : loc. T, the actual
binding of x to l is performed by a simple substitution {l/x} on T. On the other hand, the binding of y to k results from the
expansion
〈
k, ((c), (p), (q)) : T{l/x}
〉
.
The expansion is formally described in Fig. 4:
〈
V : T〉 @w intuitively corresponds to the reception of the value V at the type T
in the locationw. More speciﬁcally it plays two roles: it takes into account the location where the expansion is performed to
transform every local channel type and every local passport type into their located equivalents; and it extracts from T the
type that corresponds to every identiﬁer appearing in the value V . This is done by generating a list of identiﬁer : type. The
rules in Fig. 4 show that, when the type does not contain any local channel or local passport, the expansion is independent
of the location where it is performed. In that case, we will use the unlocated expansion (without the location @w). That is
why, in the rule (r-newloc) where the speciﬁc form of the types L prohibits local channel types and local passport types,
the expansion is used unlocated to resolve the newloc into a list of news.
The fact that dependent sums can bind variables in a type means that we will always consider types up to α-renaming
of these variables. That binding property of variables in types plays a very important role in our setting: they allow to avoid
unbound identiﬁers in the type of the values exchanged over some channel. So, for instance, r〈r〈〉@x〉@kwill not be a valid type
for a channel even if it is in the syntax of pre-types. Thanks to dependent sums, we can thus avoid substitution of variables in
types when they are instantiated after a communication. This constraint of closure of the scopes of all identiﬁers appearing
inside value types is one of the two properties that differentiate pre-types from types. The second constraint bears on types
of the form rw〈Tr ,Tw〉. When values are sent at type Tw and received at type Tr , the types Tw and Tr must be related:
considering only the permissions conveyed via types, all the received rights must have been sent. We therefore formalise
this relationship between types as a subtyping order.
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2.3.2. Subtyping
We inherit from previous works on Dπ a subtyping order. This order is extended in a fairly natural way on passport (pre-)
types: for instance, a universal passport to access l allows to come from anywhere so should be a subtype of any passport
to l. The following inference rules sum up subtyping for passports:
u˜′ ⊆ u˜
(sr-pass)
u˜ → v <: u˜′ → v
(sr-pass-*)  → v <: u˜ → v
(sr-local-pass) ↪→ v <: ↪→ v
The rule for dependent sums is even simpler:
T1 <: T2
(sr-dep) ∑
x : loc. T1 <:
∑
x : loc. T2
The other subtyping rules are standard (we condensed all the rules for channel types into one for conciseness):
(sr-loc) loc <: loc
Ti <: T′i pour tout i
(sr-tuple)
(T) <: ( T′)
C1 <: C2
(sr-loc-channel)
C1@u <: C2@u
Tw
2
<: Tw
1
<: Tr
1
<: Tr
2
(sr-channel)
rw〈Tr
1
,Tw
1
〉 <: rw〈Tr
2
,Tw
2
〉
rw〈Tr
1
,Tw
1
〉 <: w〈Tw
2
〉
rw〈Tr
1
,Tw
1
〉 <: r〈Tr
2
〉
w〈Tw
1
〉 <: w〈Tw
2
〉
r〈Tr
1
〉 <: r〈Tr
2
〉
Now that subtyping is properly deﬁned, we can formally deﬁne types:
Deﬁnition 1 (Types). A pre-type T is a typewhen:
• for every occurrence of a type of the form rw〈Tr ,Tw〉 it contains, Tw <: Tr;
• for every occurrence of a type of the form C it contains, every identiﬁer appearing in C is bound by a dependent sum.
The new subtyping rules have only a small impact over the theory of types, i.e. the structure of the ordered set of types,
for the calculus. In particular, we preserve the partialmeets property. This property bears on ↓-compatible types: we say that
any two types T1 and T2 are ↓-compatible, written T1 ↓ T2, when they share a common subtype. So the property of partial
meets can be stated as:
Theorem 2 (Partial meets). Any two ↓-compatible types have a meet.
Proof. Theproperty of partialmeets iswell-known for the standard type system inDπ (see [1]). Let us then consider passport
types: since any two passport types can have a common subtype only when they grant access to the same location, we see
easily that they must have a greatest lower bound, i.e. ameet, as soon as they have a common subtype. Dependent sums are
also easy to deal with since the dependency can only bear on variables of type loc. 
We can now build a type system for processes and systems upon this structured set of types for identiﬁers and values.
2.3.3. Typechecking processes and systems
As usual, the type system relies on type environments, written ,,, which are lists of hypotheses, i.e. associations of
types to identiﬁers, for instance l : loc, k : loc, p : → k, . . . Based on those environments, the typechecking of systems is
layered as follows:
• The consistency of environments must be checked: when a given identiﬁer is given two different types, we must verify
that those two types are ↓-compatible. This ensures thatwe cannot end up associating both a location type and a passport
type to a single identiﬁer, for instance. This is performedusing inference rules the conclusions ofwhich look like: “  env"
to mean that the environment  is well-formed. The rule for passports simply reads:
  env w : loc ∈  ∀wi ∈ w˜,wi : loc ∈ 
(e-pass)
⏐⏐((u)∪{w˜ →w})
,u : w˜ → w  env
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Fig. 5. Well-formed environments.
Fig. 6. Typing values.
which means that the extension of the well-formed environment  with hypothesis u : w˜ → w does not break the
consistency of the environment whenever:
• w and all the identiﬁers in w˜ already appear as locations in ;
• all the types that are already associated with u in , written (u), must be ↓-compatible with w˜ → w; by Theorem 2
this means that the set of all those types must have a meet which sums up all the rights granted on u.
The veriﬁcation is similar for the other identiﬁer types (see Fig. 5).
• Some inference rules then correspond to judgements of the form   u : Emeaning that the type E can be associated to u
under the set of hypotheses . In particular, subtyping has to be taken into account for this, for instance to prove
l : loc,l : loc, p : l1, l2 → l, p : l3, l4 → l  p : l1, l3 → l
i.e.where the twotypesassociatedwithp in theenvironmenthave tobecombined toconclude thatpauthorisesmigrations
from both l1 and l3. Another set of rules builds on them to obtain statements about values. Themajor difference is the fact
that those judgements are localised: in the previous environment, it is possible to conclude that p has the local passport
type ↪→ l only when the value will be used in one of the locations l1, . . . , l4. Consequently the judgements take the form
 u V : T
where u is the location in which the value V can be given the type T under the hypotheses . As for the well-formedness
of environments, the corresponding rules are fairly straightforward (see Fig. 6).
• Typechecking of processes must be performed according to the location where the process is running: the process a ! 〈〉
can be correct only when it is launched in the location of the channel a. Consequently, as for the typechecking of values,
the statements for typechecking of processes take the following form:
 u P
which intuitively states that running the process P in location uwill require at most the permissions contained in .
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Fig. 7. Typing processes.
Let us ﬁrst consider the typing rules for the use and the creation of passports.
  u : w → v  v P
(t-goto)
 w gotou v. P
  u˜ : ˜loc ; p : u˜ → w w P
(t-newpass)
 w newpass p from u˜ in P
.
These rules should be self-explanatory: to migrate between its “current" location and a location v, a process must own an
appropriate passport. Since the rules for typing identiﬁers can use subtyping, the hypothesis   u : w → v in (t-goto)
is simply stating that the passport umust be valid to enter v from any set of locations containingw. The rule (t-newpass)
is even simpler: it simply forges the passport type by using the current location so that the creation of passports to enter
a given location can happen only from inside that location. This simple property ensures that a location has an actual
control over the set of passports that grant access to it.
Notice that, in (t-newpass), the environment in which P is checked is obtained by a combination of  and p written
using “;" instead of “,": we use, in the following, semi-colons to state that the domains of deﬁnition of the two combined
environments are completely disjoint.
As we already mentioned, passports can also be generated at the same time as a location: without the possibility to set
up passports at the same time as the child location, processes coming from the mother would be denied access and vice
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Fig. 8. Bracket extension of environments.
versa. We want to be able to express all the possible links: whether the mother location gives access to the processes
coming from its child location, etc.
;〈(k, ((c), (p), (q))) : T{w/x}〉 k Pk
;〈(k, ((c), (p), (q))) : T{w/x}〉 w P(t-newloc)
 w newloc k, (c), (p), (q) : ∑ x : loc. Twith Pk in P
This typing rule uses a small “trick" with the dependent sum. Recall that the type
∑
x : loc. T appearing in the newloc
construct is of the form ∑
x : loc.
∑
y : loc. (C1@y, . . . ), (u˜1 → y, . . . ), (v˜1 → x, . . . )
The set of names p are passports to y, the second dependent variable, which will be associated to the new location k
by virtue of the expansion of the dependent sum. But the passports q should grant access to the location w where the
construct is invoked, which is why the reduction rule instantiates on the ﬂy the variable x by the name of the location.
The ﬁrst dependent sum serves thus only the role of binder for that variable.
Finally, let us look at another rule of interest:
 w P2 []u1=u2 w P1 when []u1=u2  env
(t-if)
 w if u1 = u2 then P1 else P2
This rule simply states that all the permissions available after a failed comparison between two identiﬁers u1 and u2
are only the available permissions before the test. But in the other case, the process “knows" that the two identiﬁers
are identical: we want to merge all the permissions the process owns over those two identiﬁers. This is performed
using [·]u1=u2 which modiﬁes the environment to duplicate any statement about u1 into a statement about u2 and vice
versa. So, for instance, if  contains the two hypotheses u1 : r〈〉@l and u2 : w〈〉@l, []u1=u2 will contain the four
u1 : r〈〉@l u2 : r〈〉@l u2 : w〈〉@l u1 : w〈〉@l
The operation is slightly more complex when the ui can appear in the set w˜ in a passport type w˜ → w. The full set of
cases to deﬁne the bracket extension of environments is given in Fig. 8. Notice that, when the environment contains a
hypothesis u1 : C@u2, all substitutions are not performed. But that case can fail: if u2 appears to be a location while u1 is a
channel, the test of their equality will always turn out to be false. That is why the rule (t-if)will enforce the typechecking
of the process P1 only when the environment []u1=u2 is actually well-formed: two identiﬁers with incompatible types
cannot be equal so P1 will never be triggered in that case.
The test of compatibility raises a problem. Consider the following environment:
 = p : l0 → l, xl : loc, xp : l0 → xl
and the test that xp is equal to p. []p=xp will contain p : l0 → l and p : l0 → xl . With the deﬁnition of ↓-compatibility we
gave (the fact that they share a subtype), the environment would not be well-formed because subtyping over passport
types enforces the equality of the destinations (l and xl). So we use a weak ↓-compatibility: two passport types with
different destinations are weakly ↓-compatible when at most one of the destinations is a name, all the other ones must
be variables. Indeed the cases of weak ↓-compatibility will be encountered in well-formed environments only because
of the bracket extension, i.e. only in the true branch of a test: the variables (and the eventual name) have been compared
and found equal. So those passport types can be considered compatible since we know that they will share the same
destination. The weak ↓-compatibility is also deﬁned in the same way for channel types.
The other rules of typechecking for processes are pretty much standard, see Fig. 7.
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Fig. 9. Typing systems.
• Finally, systems can be typechecked. The most typical rule simply states:
  l : loc  l P
(t-proc)
  l[[P]]
Again, these rules are completely inherited, see Fig. 9.
2.3.4. Properties of the type system
The complex type system explained in the previous sections gives two standard properties: subject reduction and type
safety.
Theorem 3 (Subject reduction).   M and M −→* N imply   N.
Proof. The form this proof takes is completely routine (see [1]) and is based on substitution lemmas. Only the use of bracket
extensions makes this proof more complex than usual, mostly because of the interactions between the substitutions and the
extensions. Let us look only at the case when
l[[a ! 〈V 〉 P1]] | l[[a ?
(
X : T) P2]]
evolves by a communication. The interested reader will ﬁnd in [19] a fully detailed account of this proof of subject reduction.
We want to prove  l P2{V/X} out of the proof of ;
〈
X : T〉 @l l P2. Note that, when proving this substitution lemma by
induction, potential tests in P2 would end up building hypothesis of the form [
′]u1=u2 u P′2 which breaks the structure of
the most natural induction hypothesis. So the substitution lemma takes the following very general form:
Lemma 4 (Substitution in processes). Let 1 and 2 be two environments, X be a pattern and V a value such that, for every v : E
in 1, 2  v{V/X} : E{V/X} is provable. Then any provable judgement 1 u P implies that the judgement 2 u{V/X} P{V/X} is also
provable.
That lemma relies on the fact that the types of values exchanged over a channel are closed: by Deﬁnition 1, every identiﬁer
appearing in a type of the form C must be bound. The absence of nested name dependency is critical to make the loose
connection between 1 and 2 sufﬁcient.
The lemma is proved by induction on the proof of 1 u P. We look here only at the twomost interesting cases. When  P is
of the form  v ?
(
X : T) P′, the absence of free variable in  T allows to lift the hypothesis on 1 and 2 to  1;
〈
X : T〉 @u and 2;〈
X : T〉 @(u{V/X}) and consequently apply the induction hypothesis to conclude.
When P is a test of the form if u1 = u2 then P1 else P2, the reasoning requires some extra care. This is done in the following
two stages:
• We ﬁrst notice that [1]u1=u2 must be well-formed when [2]u1{V/X}=u2{V/X} also is well-formed: the only possible reason
for [1]u1=u2 to be ill-formed is the existence of two incompatible types associated with a unique name. By considering
the various cases, we can easily show that this incompatibility would also be present in [2]u1{V/X}=u2{V/X}. Let us look for
instance at the case where the incompatibility is generated by two hypotheses w : C1@l1 and w : C2@l2 in  [1]u1=u2 ,
where  l1 /= l2. This implies that (w : C1@l1){V/X} and (w : C2@l2){V/X} could be inferred in [2]u1{V/X}=u2{V/X} if it were a
well-formed environment. Since the substitution {V/X} leaves names unmodiﬁed, those incompatible judgements entail
that  [2]u1{V/X}=u2{V/X} is ill-formed.• Secondly, we lift the induction hypothesis over 1 and 2 to [1]u1=u2 and [2]u1{V/X}=u2{V/X} by a simple case analysis of
the origin of every hypothesis in [1]u1=u2 . 
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The property of type safety is more relevant in the present work. Let us specialise here the property to bear on passport
types only, the result being well-known for the rest of the calculus. Following the approach developed in [20], we deﬁne
erroneous reduction of a systemM, writtenM err−→ , by the following set of rules:
l[[gotop k. P]] err−→ if  l p : l → k
M1 |M2 err−→ ifM1 err−→ orM2 err−→
(new a : E)M err−→ ifM err−→;a:E
The erroneous reduction expresses then the fact that an appropriate passport ismandatory tomigrate, and the type safety
property will allow to conclude that no process in a well-typed system will ever try to enter a location without proper right
to do so.
Theorem 5 (Type safety).   M implies M err−→ .
The proof of this theorem follows directly from the typechecking rules.
3. Loyal observational equivalence
Themaingoalofpassports is toallowa location tocontrol theprocesses it accepts.Naturally, this implies that theobservable
behaviour of a system depends on the actual authorisations the observer is granted. Let us then deﬁne an equivalence that
takes passports into account drawing inspiration from [21], namely an equivalence in which the observer does not “cheat"
and sees only what the system allows it to see.
For this, we will describe explicitly the knowledge of the observer, i.e. the rights it got access to, including its passports,
using a type environmentwritten. This type environment thus describes the observations that can beperformed, in a similar
way to the knowledge-indexed relations deﬁned in [12]. Following [12], wewill consider conﬁgurations, written  M, when
the systemM is facing anobserver knowing. That conﬁgurationwill bemeaningful onlywhen andM agree in some sense:
ifM is the system a[[P]],  should not associate a passport type to a. To avoid such conﬂicts, we will restrict our attention to
well-formed conﬁgurations, i.e. conﬁgurations   M for which there exists some environment  such that   M and  <: 
where <: is extended from types to environments in the following way: we will say that  is a subtype of ′ as soon as every
typing judgement that can be inferred in ′ can also be inferred in .
The relations will also mention the observer’s knowledge by relating conﬁgurations. Since we will mostly insist on
equivalence relations where two systems are impossible to distinguish for the same observer, we will write  MS N
when (  M)S(  N).
To obtain an observational equivalence, let us ﬁrst deﬁne the basic observations. They must be interactions with the
studied system, i.e. communications over some channels. Since channels are located, this will be possible only when the
observer is granted access to their location. To actually allow the system to “choose" which locations should be reachable, we
decided to place the observer into a fresh location. This implies that the only directly reachable locations are the destinations
of the universal passports in . So we deﬁne barbs thus:
Deﬁnition 6 (Barbs). M shows a barb on c to , written   M ⇓ c, whenever there exist a location l and a passport p such
that:
•   p : → l;
•   c : r〈T〉@l, for some type T;
• there exist some P,M′ and (a : E) with c, l ∈ a and such thatM −→*≡ (new a : E)(M′ | l[[c ! 〈V 〉 P]]).
Note that the only control performed in this deﬁnition is whether the observer is able to reach the location where the
interaction takes place: since ourmobility control happens only when entering a location, it will always be possible to report
the observation in the observer’s home location.
Some observer knowing  will be able to distinguish two systems as soon as they show different sets of barbs. To get
an equivalence out of this simple property, the observer is usually allowed to test the system by putting it in any context in
order to eventually obtain a distinguishing barb. In our setting, we should consider only loyal contexts, i.e. contexts which
use only rights available to the observer: they should not try to launch code in unreachable locations and access channels
without the corresponding permissions. We formally deﬁne a location l as reachable knowingwhen there exist a sequence
of passports p : → l1, p1 : l1 → l2, . . . , pn : ln → l in . We will write R for the set of such reachable locations. Then a
context of the form [·] | l[[P]] is loyal only when l is reachable and P is well-typed in . The observer must also be loyal when
introducing new names (for instance to be used in P):
Deﬁnition 7 (Loyal extension). ′ is a loyal extension of  when:
• ;′ is a well-formed environment;
• for every u : v˜ → w and u : C@w in ′ when w appears in , then w ∈R .
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The intuition of this notion can be given by this simple property the proof of which is immediate:
Proposition 8 (Prevention of burglaries). If ′ is a loyal extension of ,R;′ ∩ dom() =R.
Finally, we deﬁne the loyal contextuality of a relationS.
Deﬁnition 9 (Loyally contextual relation). A relationS is said loyally contextual only when:
• If MS N and ′ is a loyal extension of  such that for every hypothesis a : E in ′, a is fresh, then ;′ MS N.
• If MS N, k ∈R and   k[[P]] then M | k[[P]]S N | k[[P]].
• If; a : EMS N andbothconﬁgurations  (new a : E)M and  (new a : E)N arewell-formed, then (new a : E)MS
(new a : E)N.
Deﬁnition 10 (Loyal barbed congruence). We call loyal barbed congruence, written ∼=l , the biggest symmetric loyally con-
textual relation that preserves barbs and is closed over reductions.
The contexts considered in this congruence can launch processes in every reachable location (to allow more contexts to be
used)while barbs can only be observed in directly reachable (to get the simplest notion of observations). Note though that the
congruence obtained does not depend on this choice: it is simple to see thatwe could use reachable barbs or directly reachable
contexts and still end up deﬁning the same equivalence (indeed, reachable contexts can be obtained from directly reachable
ones with explicit migrations; and reachable barbs are only a matter of using a context to detect the barb and report it in a
directly reachable location). Our choice then corresponds to the simplest possible barbs with the greatest possible number
of contexts.
4. Loyal bisimilarity
The deﬁnition given for the loyal barbed congruence is justiﬁed by intuitions but it is highly intractable: every proof
of equivalence indeed requires a quantiﬁcation over all contexts. So we also propose a complete proof technique for this
equivalence: a bisimilarity. The idea of the bisimilarity is to provide an alternative but equivalent deﬁnition of the semantics
using a Labelled Transition System (LTS) where the labels represent the possible interactions between the system and its
environment. Then two systems can be distinguished if, after some preliminary interactions, one can perform a transition
the other cannot.
4.1. Labelled transitions system
The way the LTS is built is completely standard (see [1]): we associate the label τ to every internal reduction a system
can perform, to indicate that the environment is not involved. This means that every reduction rule of Fig. 2 but (r-comm)
becomes a transition labelled by τ . For instance, let us mention the rule (lts-goto):
  l[[gotop k. P]] τ−→   k[[P]]
Note that, since the interactions we are characterising are between some system M and an observer knowing , we deﬁne
transitions on conﬁgurations. Also note that the knowledge of the observer is left untouched in a τ transition since it is
not interacting with the system. We present in Fig. 10 the rules of the LTS, omitting (lts-newloc), (lts-newpass), (lts-if-v),
(lts-if-f), (lts-newchan), (lts-split) and (lts-rep)which are τ transitions and are directlymodelled after the corresponding
reduction rule as (lts-goto) is modelled after (r-goto).
Let us explain the major rules of the LTS and start with (lts-w). The conditions of this rule are similar to the ones for
barbs. Indeed an observer knowing  will be able to interact with a system outputting a message V on a channel a in a
location l only when l is reachable (l ∈R) and when the observer can input on that channel ( l a : r〈T〉). The knowledge
of the observer will consequently be enriched by the message:  becomes ,
〈
V : T〉 along that transition. In this expression,
the type T indicates all the rights the observer learns, calculated using the meet of the types associated with the channel.
Formally, this type is deﬁned by:
r(a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Tr ifw{E | (a : E) ∈ } = rw〈Tr ,Tw〉@l
T ifw{E | (a : E) ∈ } = r〈T〉@l
We know that we are in one of those two cases because  l a : r〈T〉.
The rule (lts-r) is symmetrical: the observer also needs to have access to the location where the interaction takes place
and to be allowed to actually send the message that the observed system will receive. Of course, the knowledge of the
observer is not increased by the message since it is its author.
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Fig. 10. Labelled transition system, signiﬁcant rules.
As usual, the rules (r-comm) and (lts-comm) have little in common: in the reduction semantics, the possibility to interact
for two processes that are not syntactically close is guaranteed via the structural congruence; in the LTS, this is replaced by
the fact that a system containing a process about to send a message will be able to perform an output transition ·!·−→. But in
the typed LTS we present here, the type environment representing the knowledge of the observer must allow the input and
the output to be performed. To ensure this, note that (lts-comm) does not specify the type environment in which both the
output and the input are possible: M and N are simply two environments in which the transitions can be proved. And,
as soon as two such environments exist, we can conclude that the two subsystems can communicate. We can also notice
that (lts-comm) must close, as usual, the scopes of the names, scopes that must be opened by (lts-open) to permit the
communication: here this implies that the output labels have to contain the types associated with all the names; this is why
we reuse the notation for type environments () in labels.
Finally, let us look at the rule (lts-weak). Exactly as (lts-w) which closely matches the criterion used in deﬁning barbs,
that rule is constrained in the same way as the loyal contextuality (Deﬁnition 9).
Since the LTSdeﬁnes somesemantics for the calculus,wewant tomake sure that the semantics coincidewith the reduction
semantics:
Theorem 11 (Coincidence of semantics). The reduction semantics and the semantics extracted from the LTS coincide in the sense
of the following two properties:
•   M τ−→   M′ implies that M −→ M′;
• M −→ M′ implies that there exists some M′′ ≡ M′ with   M τ−→   M′′.
Proof. That fairly routine proof is decomposed in the following way:
(1) For the ﬁrst implication, it is enough to notice that a system onwhich (lts-comm) is applicable is structurally congruent
to a system on which (r-comm) is applicable.
(2) For the second implication the structural congruence and (r-comm) require a bit of work.
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• For the structural congruence, we simply prove: 1  M1 μ−→ 2  M2 andM1 ≡ M1 implies that 1  M1 μ¯−→ 2  M2
andM1 ≡ M2 where μ¯ is μ up to some permutation inwhen μ = ()c!V . This is done by looking at the justiﬁcation
ofM1 ≡ M1.
• For (r-comm), the fact that   M is well-formed implies that M = l[[c ! 〈V 〉 P]] | l[[c ? (X : T)Q ]] is well-typed in some
environment . It is then easy to see that the conﬁgurations   l[[c ! 〈V 〉 P]] and   l[[c ? (X : T)Q ]] can perform,
respectively, an output and an input action. 
4.2. Bisimilarity equivalence
With the LTS deﬁned above, we would like to deﬁne an equivalence R as a standard bisimulation: when M R N
and   M μ−→ ′  M′ then there must exist some N′ such that   N μˆ=⇒ ′  N′ and ′ M′ R N′ where τˆ=⇒ = τ−→* and μˆ=⇒ =
τ−→* μ−→ τ−→* when μ /= τ . Remark that the use of the same ′ forM and N is not constraining: the knowledge of the observer
is modiﬁed in exactly the same way along the transitions μ−→ and μˆ=⇒, whatever μ may be.
Unfortunately this deﬁnition cannot be used right away in our case, because of dependent types. Let us consider a
case where the discrepancy appears. Suppose some channel c in l on which a passport can be transmitted (so c is of type
rw〈∑ x, y : loc. x → y〉@l) and consider the following two systems:
(new k′ : loc) (new p : k, k′ → l) l[[c ! 〈(k, l), (p)〉 d ! 〈k′〉]] (1)
(new k′ : loc) (new p : k → l) l[[c ! 〈(k, l), (p)〉 d ! 〈k′〉]] (2)
The only difference is the fact that the passport p can be used also from the new location k′ in the ﬁrst system. Since the
observer receives p at the type k → l in both cases, it should not be able to make the difference. But they can perform the
following transitions with distinct labels (for simplicity, we ignore the type annotations in the labels):
  (1) (k′ ,p)c!((k,l),(p))−−−−−−−−−→ , p : k → l  l[[d ! 〈k′〉]]
d!k′−−→ , p : k → l, k′ : loc  l[[stop]]
  (2) (p)c!((k,l),(p))−−−−−−−−→ , p : k → l  (new k′ : loc) l[[d ! 〈k′〉]]
(k′)d!k′−−−−→ , p : k → l, k′ : loc  l[[stop]]
namely not opening the scope of k′ in the same transition. To avoid this problem, we annotate conﬁgurations with a set
of names whose scopes have been opened because of type dependencies, not because they were revealed. The labels are
modiﬁed accordingly to mention only the names that are actually revealed.
Deﬁnition 12 (Actions). The annotated conﬁguration  a˜ M can perform the action μ and become ′ a˜′ M′ when:
• if μ is τ or ()a?V : the transition   M μ−→ ′  M′ is provable in the LTS and a˜ = a˜′;
• if μ is (b˜)a!V : the transition   M ()a!V−−−→ ′  M′ is provable in the LTS, b˜ = fn(V) ∩ (dom() ∪ a˜) and a˜′ = (dom() ∪ a˜) \
fn(V).
So the deﬁnition of actions enforces that the names b˜ mentioned in an output action are indeed revealed to the observer,
since they must appear in the message (i.e. in the set fn(V)), whether their scopes is opened by this action (so appearing in
dom()) or kept hidden in the annotation a˜.
The two previous systems, with empty annotations, can then perform the following actions:
 ∅ (1) (p)c!((k,l),(p))−−−−−−−−→ , p : k → l {k′} l[[d !
〈
k′
〉]]
(k′)d!k′−−−−→ , p : k → l, k′ : loc ∅ l[[stop]]
 ∅ (2) (p)c!((k,l),(p))−−−−−−−−→ , p : k → l ∅ (new k′ : loc) l[[d !
〈
k′
〉]]
(k′)d!k′−−−−→ , p : k → l, k′ : loc ∅ l[[stop]]
Using those annotated conﬁgurations, it becomes possible to deﬁne a meaningful equivalence as a bisimilarity.
Deﬁnition 13 (Loyal bisimilarity). The loyal bisimilarity, written ≈al , is the largest bisimulation deﬁned in the standard way
over actions of annotated conﬁgurations.
4.3. Equivalences coincidence
Since the bisimilarity has been introduced as a proof technique, we have to prove that, under some conditions, the two
equivalences coincide. The proof of that property is signiﬁcantly more complex than its equivalent in the literature (see for
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instance [12]): the control of migrations hinders tracking the knowledge of the observer (apart from the passports, note that
we must keep track of annotations because they hide some names from the observer).
4.3.1. Dealing with annotations
The ﬁrst difference to take into account is the fact that the bisimilarity is deﬁned over annotated conﬁgurations contrary
to the barbed congruence. This is bypassed by simply considering annotated typed relations, written
M a˜MSa˜N N
Using those annotated relations, we can deﬁne again a notion of contextuality: the only difference with the deﬁnition 9 is
the fact that contexts of the form [·] | l[[P]] can be usedwith the hypothesisM a˜MSa˜N N only when none of the free names
of that context are in the annotations a˜M and a˜N . This is a mere consequence of the fact that the names in the annotations
are still hidden to the observer.
To obtain an annotated barbed congruence, we should also deﬁne the barbs of annotated conﬁgurations. But the possible
interactions of  a˜ M are exactly the interactions of   M since the names a˜ are hidden to the observer so   M will never
show a barb on some name awhen a ∈ a˜.
Deﬁnition 14 (Annotated loyal barbed congruence). We call annotated loyal barbed congruence, written ∼=al , the biggest
symmetric loyally contextual annotated relation that preserves barbs and is closed over reductions.
Note that the conditions which deﬁne ∼=al never modify the annotations. Because of this, we directly obtain that ∼=l is
equal to ∅∼=al∅. Now we can prove that ∼=al and ≈al coincide by proving both inclusions.
4.3.2. The bisimilarity is included in the barbed congruence
The proof of this inclusion is mainly the proof of the fact that the bisimilarity is contextual. This is naturally done by
checking all three items deﬁning contextuality, the major property to check being:
Lemma 15 (Bisimilarity is closed on loyal extensions). If M a˜M≈ala˜N N and ′ is a loyal extension of  such that for every
hypothesis a : E in ′, a is fresh, then ;′ M a˜M≈ala˜N N.
Proof. ′ is a loyal extension introducing only fresh names for. So an observer knowing;′ cannot observe any action
could not. This means that every action of the conﬁguration ;′ a˜M M is also an action of  a˜M M. The result follows
easily. 
Theorem 16 (Bisimilarity is closed on parallel contexts). If M a˜M≈ala˜N N, l ∈R,  l[[O]] and fn(O) ∩ (a˜M ∪ a˜N) = ∅ then
M | l[[O]] a˜M≈ala˜N N | l[[O]].
Proof. To get this result we build a relation and prove that it is a bisimulation which induces the fact that it is included in
the biggest bisimulation, ≈al . Because that relation must be closed on reductions, we will consider a relationS in which
systems have a very general form:
 (newM)(M |
∏
i
li[[Oi]]) a˜MSa˜N (newN)(N |
∏
i
li[[Oi]])
The main difﬁculty to tackle is the fact that, along reductions, the knowledge of the observer, initially completely located
in  (because l[[O]] is well-typed in ), is split between  and ∏i li[[Oi]]. In particular, a part of the environments  and
annotations a˜ should be included in the general knowledge of the observer since theymight have been communicated to the
processes Oi. A precise account of this knowledge is kept to preserve the full-strength of the initial hypothesis of bisimilarity
betweenM and N. So we will impose the following conditions on the relationS.
• There exists some environment O that can be split into two parts (where X stands for bothM and N):
◦ a subtype environment of  (that can contain some knowledge about a˜X but none about the names in X );
◦ a supertype environment of X .
The way O is split into those two pieces is, in general, different forM and N.
• There exists some set of namesNO that contains all the names which are known to the observer. That set contains in
particular all the names in O and all the names appearing in Oi.
• O; p1 : → l1, . . . M a˜i
M
≈ala˜i
N
N where the passports pi are fresh and a˜
i
X are the names actually hidden to the observer
(a˜iX = (dom(X ) ∪ a˜X ) \NO). The passports pi represent the fact that the observer has access, via the processes Oi, to the
locations li.
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• The names which are bound in dom(X ) ∪ a˜X and which are known to the observer (i.e. are inNO) must be the same
forM and N. Formally, (dom(M) ∪ a˜M) ∩NO = (dom(N) ∪ a˜N) ∩NO.
• Finally, the processes Oi controlled by the observer must use only permissions he managed to get so O 
∏
i li[[Oi]].
The complete proof that S is indeed a bisimulation (up to structural congruence to tidy terms) is structured in this
way: for every action performed by a system, we identify which parts are actually involved (M alone;
∏
i li[[Oi]] alone; or a
communication between those two). Let us consider an action performed by the system containing M, and let us look ﬁrst
at the case whereM is alone to perform the action.
M alone This must then be of the form:
  (newM)(M |
∏
i
li[[Oi]]) μ−→ ′  (newM′ )(M′ |
∏
i
li[[Oi]])
If this is τ transition, it can be performed regardless of the knowledge of the observer and of the annotations. So
O; p1 : → l1, . . . a˜i
M
M −→ O; p1 : → l1, . . . a˜i
M
M′
and N can perform an equivalent reduction because it is bisimilar.
If μ is the output (b˜)c!V−−−→, the action must be proved by a transition of the LTS of the form:
  (newM)(M |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
(′
M
)c!V−−−−→ ,〈V : r(c)〉 @l  (newM′ )(M′ |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
the proof of which contains the proof of the transition ofM alone, namely:
  M (′′M )c!V−−−−→ ,〈V : r(c)〉 @l  M′
We can prove that any transition of a conﬁguration   M can also be performed by ′  M where ′ <:  by an induction
on the proof of the transition. This induces that:
O; p1 : → l1, . . .  M (
′′
M
)c!V−−−−→ O; p1 : → l1, . . . ,
〈
V : r(c)〉 @l  M′
which corresponds to some action:
O; p1 : → l1, . . . a˜i
M
M (b˜
′)c!V−−−→ O; p1 : → l1, . . . ,
〈
V : ′r(c)
〉
@l a˜i
M′
M′
that must be matched by some action:
O; p1 : → l1, . . . a˜i
N
N (b˜
′)c!V===⇒ O; p1 : → l1, . . . ,
〈
V : ′r(c)
〉
@l a˜i
N′
N′
with
O; p1 : → l1, . . . ,
〈
V : ′r(c)
〉
@lM′ a˜i
M′
≈ala˜i
N′
N′
The action performed by N must be proved by a transition
O; p1 : → l1, . . .  N (
′′
N
)c!V====⇒ O; p1 : → l1, . . . ,
〈
V : ′r(c)
〉
@l  N′
Naturally, we would like to deduce that   N can also perform this transition. Since   M can perform a similar transition,
we know that all the required rights for the output on the channel c to be visible are available in: namelywe can prove l
c : r〈T〉 and l ∈R. We say that  enables the output on the channel c. Because that output is enabled, we can prove, by an
induction on the proof of the transition of O; p1 : → l1, . . .  N, that   N can perform the same transition. We conclude
consecutively that:
  N (′′N )c!V====⇒ ,〈V : r(c)〉 @l  N′
so   (newN)(N |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
(′
N
)c!V====⇒ ,〈V : r(c)〉 @l  (newN′ )(N′ |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
and  a˜N (newN)(N |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
(b˜′′)c!V====⇒ ,〈V : r(c)〉 @l a˜N′ (newN′ )(N′ |
∏
i li[[Oi]])
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For this action to be the expected one, namely (b˜)c!V , we must check that b˜ = b˜′′.
b˜′′ = (dom(′N) ∪ a˜N) ∩ fn(V)
=
(
(dom(′N) ∪ a˜N) ∩ fn(V) ∩NO
)
∪
(
((dom(′N) ∪ a˜N) ∩ fn(V)) \NO
)
Since
(dom(′N) ∪ a˜N) ∩NO = (dom(′M) ∪ a˜M) ∩NO
only the second part of the b˜′′ is still to be checked. Note that
dom(′N) ∩ fn(V) = (dom(N) ∪ dom(′′N)) ∩ fn(V)
since all the names that are mentioned in V must be opened.
((dom(′N) ∪ a˜N) ∩ fn(V)) \NO
=
(
(dom(N) ∪ dom(′′N) ∪ a˜N) \NO
)
∩ fn(V)
=
(
a˜iN ∪ (dom(′′N) \NO)
)
∩ fn(V)
Since, by deﬁnition,NO is the set of names known to the observer, it cannot contain a name of dom(′′N). So this second part
is exactly
(a˜iN ∪ dom(′′N)) ∩ fn(V) = b˜′ = (a˜iM ∪ dom(′′M)) ∩ fn(V)
which ﬁnishes to prove that b˜′′ = b˜, i.e. the system containingM and the one containing N can perform the same action.
To completely prove that we stay in the relationS, we still need to check that all the induction hypotheses are preserved
after this action. For this we deﬁne quite naturally the resulting environment ′
O
as O,
〈
V : r(c)〉 @l since that’s all the
knowledge the observer got in the action. This new′
O
can still be split into the hypotheses it contains over names appearing
in dom(M′ ) and a subtype environment of,
〈
V : r(c)〉 @l.We also deﬁne, similarly,N′O asNO ∪ fn(V). Finally the equalities
concerning the annotations (a˜M′ , a˜N′ but also a˜
i
M′ and a˜
i
N′ ) and the other sets of names can be checked following reasoning
similarly to the one we gave for b˜ and b˜′′.
If the system containing M performs an input ()a?V instead of an output, the reasoning is far easier since M alone can
perform exactly the same action (the  does not have to be modiﬁed) and all annotations are left unchanged.
∏
i li[[Oi]] alone In that case, it is easy to see that both systems will be able to perform the same action. The only difﬁculty
to take into account is the fact that some Oi0 might generate a new location name and change the general structure of the
system into some ∏
i
li[[Oi]] |((new) k[[Ok]] | li0 [[O′i0 ]]) |
∏
i
li[[Oi]]
To regain the induction structure, we use the fact that S is to be a bisimulation up to structural congruence, using the
structural congruence to join  and M , respectively, N . Besides,  is fully added to the knowledge of the observer: 
′
O
is O;, to be able to type
∏
i li[[Oi]] | k[[Ok]] | li0 [[O′i0 ]] |
∏
i li[[Oi]]. Finally, a new passport pk must be added to the obtain the
hypothesis
′O; p1 : → l1, . . . , pk : → kM a˜i
M
≈ala˜i
N
N
Since pk , k and all of  is fresh, it is easy to see that this follows from the hypothesis O; p1 : → l1, . . . M a˜i
M
≈ala˜i
N
N. The
other hypotheses are automatically preserved.
The other technical case to check is when the action performed is an output or an input. The reasoning for these cases is
similar and simpler than the one whenM performs the action.
Communication between M and
∏
i li[[Oi]] This supposes that M is performing an output and
∏
i li[[Oi]] an input or vice versa.
Note thatM and N are known to be bisimilar for an observer having explicit access to all the locations li, in particular the one
where the communication takes place. Thanks to this, the reasoning is similar to the previous cases. 
Lemma 17 (Bisimilarity is closed on restrictions). If ; a : EM a˜M≈ala˜N N and both conﬁgurations   (new a : E)M and  
(new a : E)N are well-formed, then  (new a : E)M a˜M≈ala˜N (new a : E)N.
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Proof. To prove this lemma, let us consider the relationS deﬁned by:
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
 (new a : E)M a˜MSa˜N (new a : E)N
 (new a : E)M a˜MSa˜N ,a N
M a˜M ,aSa˜N (new a : E)N
M a˜M ,aSa˜N ,a N
if
⎧⎨
⎩
a ∈ a˜M et a ∈ a˜N
; a : EM a˜M≈ala˜N N
 a˜M (new a : E)M and  a˜N (new a : E)N are well-formed
and the relation R = ≈al ∪S. The proof that this relation is a bisimulation is fairly easy by an analysis of the different
possible cases for the scope of the name a: open (in which case we must be in ≈al), or one of the two ways to be closed
(restriction or annotation) in both M and N. This analysis must be done only for outputs: on inputs no modiﬁcation of the
scope of a can happen. 
We have now the tools to obtain:
Theorem 18. ≈al ⊆ ∼=al
Proof. A barb on a channel c corresponds exactly to an action (·)c!· so ≈al must preserve barbs. The fact that it is closed
on reductions follows from Theorem 11. And its loyal annotated contextuality is given by Theorem 16 and Lemmas 15
and 17. 
4.3.3. The barbed congruence is included in the bisimilarity
The proof of the converse involves another equivalence relation to be used as an intermediary: the choice of that equiv-
alence must facilitate both the proof of its inclusion into ≈al and the proof that it includes ∼=al . The relation we used is a
parallel congruencewritten∼=p, namely the biggest relationwhich is closed on parallel context and extension of the observer’s
environment but not on contexts of the form (new a : E)[·]. The result that the parallel barbed congruence contains the normal
barbed congruence is then immediate. Sowe simply have to prove that the parallel congruence is included in the bisimilarity.
The guiding idea of the deﬁnition of the actions was to identify all the possible interactions between a system and its
observer. So the proof of that inclusion can be based on the deﬁnition of contexts that characterise a given action of the
system. Those contexts use the fact that we can put any environment  in a normal form looking like:
w1 : loc, . . . ,wm : loc,
u1 : w˜i1 → wi1 , . . . ,un : w˜in → win ,
v1 : C1@wj1 , . . . , vo : Co@wjo
where
• the wk are all distinct;
• uk = uk′ only if k = k′ or if wik /= wik′ ;• vk = vk′ only if k = k′ or if wjk /= wjk′ .
So this normal form has the following structure: all the locations are deﬁned ﬁrst because types can depend only on location
identiﬁers so that all the locations can be listed ﬁrst; and every identiﬁer is attributed exactly one type per location identiﬁer
to which it is attached since the well-formedness of environments ensures that any two types associated with a given
identiﬁer must be weakly ↓-compatible (remember that when typechecking processes, a given channel or passport can be
attached tomore than one location variable). The existence of such a normal form follows from the property of partial meets
(Theorem 2) which ensures that all the types associated with a given identiﬁer sum up to their meet.
This normal form of environments is relevant for the contexts that characterise the actions of a system because they
provide a way to encode every environment into a value of the calculus.
Deﬁnition 19 (Reiﬁcation of environments). To an environment  of the following (normal) form:
w1 : loc, . . . ,wm : loc,
u1 : w˜i1 → wi1 , . . . ,un : w˜in → win ,
v1 : C1@wj1 , . . . , vo : Co@wjo
we associate the value
V = ((w1, . . . ,wm), (u1, . . . ,un, v1, . . . , vo))
of type
T =
∑
x1, . . . , xm : ˜loc. x˜i1 → xi1 , . . . , x˜

in
→ xin ,C1@xj1 , . . . ,Co@xjo
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Proposition 20 (Soundness of the reiﬁcation). For anywell-formed environment and any locationw deﬁned in, w V : T.
To prove that the parallel congruence is included in the bisimilarity, we want to prove that it is a bisimulation. For this,
let us consider an element in the parallel congruence, say M a˜M∼=pa˜N N, and let us suppose that  a˜M M can perform an
output action (b˜)c!U. Let us deﬁne some context that can detect that very output action and that, when that action has been
performed, outputs on some fresh channel ω the value V,〈U:r (c)〉, namely the reiﬁcation of the knowledge of the observer
after the action. Such a context might be of the form l[[O]] where l is the location of the channel c in which the action takes
place. Note that the observer can launch some process in l since the action (b˜)c!U is visible to the observer : by rule (lts-w)
this implies that l is inR. Then O performs the following steps:
(1) It waits for a message on the channel c and, in parallel, exhibit a barb on some special channel δ.
(2) It checks that the received valuematches the expected U: this relies on the possibility to test the equality and inequality
of names; in particular, to check that the names in b˜ are indeed fresh, the context is parameterised with a ﬁnite set of
existing namesNwhich contains all the names that could be distinguished. This test matches exactly the deﬁnition of
the set b˜ in output actions: this set contains only the names which were hidden within the system or the annotation
and which are revealed to the observer.
(3) It ﬁnally cancels the barb on δ and outputs the value V,〈U:r (c)〉 on the channel ω.
The channel δ used in the context serves only one purpose: to check that the step 2 has actually been performed: since the
detected barbs always allow some preliminary τ transitions, the barb on ω is visible since the very beginning as soon as the
system can perform the action.
Let us detail a bit more the step 2: the context has received some value U ′ that got substituted for some pattern X and it
must check that U ′ is U.
• The context must test that all the names that appear at some positions in U and that are not in b˜ also appear in the same
positions in U ′.
• It must then check that the names appearing in U ′ at the positions of some names among b˜ in U are yet unknown: for
this, it checks that those names are different from every name in some setN containing at least all the names appearing
in  and inM apart from the names a˜M .
• Finally, it must also check that all the names appearing in U ′ at the positions of the b˜s in U are distinct from each other,
except when they are the same b ∈ b˜ in U in which case it must check that they are indeed equal. This last check is
mandatory to distinguish between the actions (b1, b2)c!(b1, b1, b2) and (b1, b2)c!(b1, b2, b2) for instance.
We will write this sequence of tests X =N (b˜)U.
So we can deﬁne the context for that action:
Deﬁnition 21 (Output-identifying context). To the output action (b˜)c!V , the knowledge of the observer  and the set of
identiﬁable namesN, we associate the context
C

N((b˜)c!U) = [·] | λ[[δ ! 〈〉]] |
l[[c ? (X : r(c))
if X =N (b˜)U then gotoπ λ. δ ? () ω !
〈
V,〈U{xp1/b1}···{xpn/bn}:r (c)〉@l
〉
else stop]]
where:
• the names λ, π , δ and ω are fresh;
• xpi is a variable appearing in the pattern X at a position of bi in U.
Note that λ : loc,π : → λ, δ : rw〈〉@λ,ω : rw〈T,〈U:r (c)〉〉@λ is a loyal extension for  and that the context CN((b˜)c!U) is
well-typed in  thus extended.
We now state the property the context was deﬁned for:
Lemma 22 (Output actions are deﬁnable). Let  be an environment, α an output action (b˜)c!U which is visible to ,M a system
andN a set of names such that a˜M ∩N = ∅ and (fn(M) \ a˜M) ⊆N.
 a˜M M α−→  after α a˜′M M
′
implies
C

N(α)[M] ⇒ (new)(M′ | λ[[stop]] | λ[[ω !
〈
V,〈U:r (c)〉
〉
]])
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where dom() = (b˜ ∪ a˜′M) \ a˜M .
Conversely
C

N(α)[M] ⇒ M′′
when λπωδ a˜M M′′ ⇓ ω and λπωδ a˜M M′′ ⇓ δ where λπωδ = ; λ : loc;π : → λ;ω : rw〈T,〈U:r (c)〉〉@λ; δ : rw〈〉@λ im-
plies that M′′ must be structurally congruent to (new)(M′ | λ[[stop]] | λ[[ω !
〈
V,〈U:r (c)〉
〉
]]) with
 a˜M M α=⇒ ,
〈
U : r(c)〉 a˜′
M
M′
b˜ = (dom() ∪ a˜M) ∩ fn(V) and a˜′M = (dom() ∪ a˜M) \ fn(V).
Proof. The ﬁrst implication mostly amounts to checking that the sequence of tests X =N (b˜)U are a success when U is
substituted for X .
To prove the second implication, we rely on the Theorem 11 to obtain
λπωδ  CN(α)[M] τ−→* λπωδ  M′′′
with M′′′ ≡ M′′. Since λπωδ a˜M M′′′ does not exhibit any barb on δ, we know that the whole context has been reduced.
In particular we can extract the proof of M performing the output and we know that the sequence of tests X =N (b˜)U was
successful, which concludes the proof. 
The contexts characterising inputs are even simpler and look like:
C

N(c?V) = [·] | λ[[δ ! 〈〉]] | l[[c !
〈
V
〉
gotoπ λ. δ ? () ω !
〈
V
〉]]
Note that, for the input ()c?V ,  is a loyal extension of  and since ∼=p is closed on loyal extensions, there is no need to
generate the names in  in the context.
The last property of interest to ﬁnish our proof deals with the fact that the knowledge of the environment encoded in a
value can be recovered.
Lemma 23 (Scope extrusion). If
λ : loc,π : → λ,ω : rw〈T〉@λ
(newM)(M | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]]) a˜M∼=pa˜N (newN)(N | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]])
and the names λ,π and ω are fresh for M and N, then
M a˜′
M
∼=pa˜′
N
N
where a˜′M = (a˜M ∪ dom(M)) \ dom() and a˜′N = (a˜N ∪ dom(N)) \ dom().
Proof. Of course, this proof is done by considering the relationS:
M a˜′
M
Sa˜′
N
N
and proving that it is included in ∼=p by checking that it veriﬁes all the deﬁning conditions of ∼=p.
The intuition of that proof is basically that a context can be added to the system (newM)(M | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]]), recover the
value V and perform the expected test. For instance, to check thatS is barb-preserving, we use systems of the form
λ[[ω ? (X : T
)
gotoxp xl. xc ?
(
Y : r(c)) gotoπ λ. δ ! 〈〉]]
where xc , xl and xp are the variables of the pattern X corresponding to a channel on which a barb must be detected, the
location of that channel and a passport leading to that location. (We use xa to denote the variable of X corresponding to a
in V). Putting this in parallel to a system will exhibit a barb on δ if and only if there was a barb on c.
Let us prove thatS is closed on parallel contexts, this being the most difﬁcult case. Consider for this the context [·] | k[[P]]
where   k[[P]] and k ∈R. We transform this context into
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Cp = [·] | λ[[ω ?
(
X : T
)
ωp !
〈
X
〉 | gotoxq1 xl1 . . . .gotoxqm xk. P{X/V}]]
where q1, . . . , qm et l1, . . . , lm = k are the sequences of passports and locations proving k ∈R.
We know then that:
λπωωp 
(newM)(M | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]]) |Cp a˜M∼=pa˜N (newN)(N | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]]) |Cp
It is easy to see that this entails:
λπωp 
(newM)(M | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]] |Cp) a˜M∼=pa˜N (newN)(N | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]] |Cp)
To ﬁnish the proof we need to prove that it induces
λπωp 
(newM)(M | k[[P]] | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]]) a˜M∼=pa˜N (newN)(N | k[[P]] | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]])
i.e. the reductions introduced byCp can be performedwithout getting out of the equivalence. In fact, it is fairly easy to prove
that the reduced system is bisimilar to the original one:
λπωp 
(newM)(M | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]] |Cp) a˜M≈ala˜M (newM)(M | k[[P]] | λ[[ω !
〈
V
〉]])
and Theorem 18 and transitivity of ∼=p ﬁnish that proof. 
So we can ﬁnally reach our aim:
Theorem 24. ∼=p ⊆ ≈al
Proof. We simply prove that ∼=p is a bisimulation. For this consider M a˜M∼=pa˜N N. When the conﬁguration  a˜M M
performsa τ action to a˜M M′, Theorem11and the closure of∼=p on reductions allows toﬁndaN′ such thatM′ a˜M∼=pa˜N N′.
For the output action  a˜M M α−→ ′ a˜′M M′, Lemma 22 proves that C

N(α)[M] can reduce into some system (newM)M′
| λ[[stop]] | λ[[ω ! 〈V′
〉]]. By contextuality and closure on reductions,CN(α)[N] should reach an equivalent state,with a barb onω
and no barb on δ. Using the other direction of Lemma 22, that equivalent state must be congruent to (newN)N
′ | λ[[stop]] |
λ[[ω! 〈V′
〉]] with  a˜N N α=⇒ ′ a˜′N N′. Now Lemma 23 ﬁnishes the proof that ′ M′ a˜′M∼=pa˜′N N′.
The reasoning is similar for input actions. 
Lemmas 18 and 24 and the correspondence between ∼=al and ∼=l directly entail the expected result:
Theorem 25 (Full abstraction of ≈al for ∼=l). M ∼=l N if and only if M ∅≈al∅ N.
5. Conclusion and perspectives
This work presents a new approach to control the migrations of agents in the context of distributed computation, using
simple passports that should correspond to the origin location of the migrating agent. We have developed the full theory of
this idea, with a loyal barbed congruence that takes those passports into account to distinguish between systems. We have
also provided a complete proof technique for this equivalence as a bisimilarity.
This work provides a solid ground on which to investigate subtler notions of security like the ones presented in [13]
and [22]. We already started to study more complex passports in which resources that can be accessed after the migration
depend on the passport actually used: when a new passport is generated, its type also embed all the rights to be granted to
incoming processes.
It would also be interesting to reﬁne passports to stricter notions of trust, where other locations are prevented from
relaying processes for instance.
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